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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of extreme fluctuations in bank asset values on the capital 
adequacy and default probabilities (PD) of Japanese Banks. We apply quantile regression 
analysis to the Merton structural credit model to measure how capital adequacy and PDs 
fluctuate over a 10 year period incorporating the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Quantile 
regressions allow modelling of the extreme quantiles of a distribution, as opposed to 
focussing on the mean, which allows measurement of capital and PDs at the most extreme 
points of an economic downturn. Understanding extreme risk is essential, as it is during these 
extreme circumstances when banks are most likely to fail. We find highly significant 
variances in bank capital adequacy and default probabilities between quantiles, and show 
how these variances can assist banks and regulators in calculating capital buffers which will 
sustain banks through volatile times. Quantile regression has been successfully applied to the 
measurement of extreme market (share price) risk by a number of studies, and this paper 
develops unique and innovative techniques for extending this approach to structural credit 
risk modelling. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) has highlighted the devastating effect that high 
credit risk can have on financial markets and economic stability. During this period, impaired 
assets (problem loans) of banks more than trebled in the US and UK. 161 Banks failed in the 
US in the two years 2008 – 2009 as compared to 3 in 2007 and none in the prior two years 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2010). Bank capital shortages led to the need for 
government financial rescue packages for banks in the US, UK and many other countries. 
Share markets plunged, and economic stimulus packages and slashing of interest rates were 
required to shore up major world economies. In short, the subject of credit risk in extreme 
circumstances has become one of the most important and intensely scrutinised topics in 
finance today.  
Japan is a particularly important market to study in a credit context, with Japanese 
banks having experienced a prolonged series of crises, commencing with the bursting of an 
asset price bubble (real estate and stock prices) in the early 90’s, followed by the Asian Crisis 
which commenced in the late 90’s, and then to top it off, the GFC from 2007 onwards. Japan 
is considered to have fared better than the US and European markets during the GFC, due to a 
lower exposure to sub-prime securities and higher credit standards. The latter was as a result 
of lessons learned during prior crises, resulting in substantially lower non-performing loans 
as compared to the situation in the early 2000’s (see Section 2 for details). Against this 
background, using quantile regressions, we show how despite having fared better than global 
peers, based on fluctuating asset values the default probabilities and capital adequacy of 
Japanese banks were severely impacted during the GFC.    
Many prevailing credit models were designed to measure credit risk on the basis of 
‘average’ credit risks over a period, or credit risk at a specific point in time. The problem 
with these approaches is that they are not designed to measure the most extreme losses, i.e. 
the tail of the credit loss distribution. It is precisely during these extreme circumstances when 
firms are most likely to fail. Some examples of well known models in this category include 
the z score developed by Altman (1968 and revisited Altman, 2000) which uses five balance 
sheet ratios to predict bankruptcy; Moody’s KMV Company (2003) RiskCalc model, which 
uses 11 financial measures to provide an Estimated Default Frequency (EDF) for private 
firms; Ratings agencies which provide credit ratings based on customer creditworthiness, but 
which are not designed to ratchet up and down with changing market conditions; 
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CreditMetrics (Gupton, Finger, & Bhatia, 1997) which incorporates credit ratings into a 
transition matrix that measures the probability of transitioning from one rating to another, 
including the probability of default; and the Basel Accord standardised approach which 
measures corporate credit risk for capital adequacy purposes by applying risk weightings to 
customers on the basis of their external credit rating. 
Other models use Value at Risk (VaR), which is one of the most widely used 
approaches for measuring credit and market risk by banks, on the basis of risks falling below 
a pre-determined threshold at a selected level of confidence, such as 95% or 99%. A key 
shortfall of this approach is that it says nothing of risk beyond VaR and it is usually based on 
a normal distribution Gaussian approach which does not adequately capture tail risk. Critics 
have included Standard and Poor’s analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & Hill, 2005) due to 
inconsistency of VaR application across institutions and lack of tail risk assessment. Artzner, 
Delbaen, Eber, & Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have undesirable mathematical 
properties (most notably lack of sub-additivity), whereas Pflug (2000) proved that 
Conditional Value at Risk (CvaR), which looks at losses beyond VaR does not have these 
undesirable properties.   In assessing why existing credit models failed in the credit crisis, Sy 
(2008) finds that most existing credit models are based on a reduced form linear approach 
which have typical reliance on having large amounts of statistical data coming from a quasi-
equilibrium state, and that this approach is ineffective in making even short-term forecasts in 
rapidly changing environments such as in a credit crisis. The study finds that such inductive 
models have failed to predict what would happen just when they were most needed to. Hedge 
fund returns have also been found to deviate from the VaR Gaussian approach (Bali, Gokcan, 
& Liang, 2007; Gupta & Liang, 2005). Jackson, Maude & Perraudin (1998) found that VaR 
estimates based on a simulation approach outperformed VaR estimates based on a Gaussian 
approach. Ohran and Karaahmet (2009) found that VaR works well when the economy is 
functioning smoothly, but fails during times of economic stress, because VaR is ignorant of 
the extreme losses beyond VaR.  
The Merton / KMV model (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003; Merton, 1974), does measure 
fluctuating risk over time using a combination of the structure of the customer’s balance sheet 
and movements in market asset values to calculate default probabilities. However, again this 
is based on an ‘average’ over the time period measured, and does not highlight the extreme 
quantiles within the measured period. 
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 Credit models which do not adequately measure tail risk could lead to banks having 
underprovisions or capital shortages during extreme economic circumstances. During the 
GFC, many global banks were not adequately prepared to deal with the extent of defaults and 
increased impaired assets occurring during this time, and were left scrambling for capital and 
funding just when it was most difficult to obtain. Per the International Monetary Fund 
(Caruana & Narain, 2008), “it (Basel) does emphasize that banks should address volatility in 
their capital allocation and define strategic plans for raising capital that take into account their 
needs, especially in a stressful economic environment”. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2008) stated that capital adequacy requirements should include “introducing a 
series of measures to promote the build-up of capital buffers in good times that can be drawn 
upon in periods of stress.  A countercyclical capital framework will contribute to a more 
stable banking system, which will help dampen, instead of amplify, economic and financial 
shocks”. Indeed, recently announced changes to Basel II (i.e. Basel III) include requirements 
for such capital buffers.  Capital as pointed out by the Bank of England (2008), reduces 
during a downturn period due to declining market based asset values and, under these 
circumstances a mark-to-market approach provides a measure of how much capital needs to 
be raised to restore confidence in a bank’s market capitalization. Inadequate focus on 
potential tail risk meant many banks were unprepared and undercapitalised to deal with the 
extreme events of the GFC. 
This research addresses a major gap in existing credit models. Whereas existing 
models focus on ‘average risk’ or risk below a defined threshold, we use quantile regressions 
to divide the data into different tranches, enabling the researcher to isolate and model the 
most risky tranches. Quantile regression, as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) has 
successfully measured extreme market risk (share prices) as it is more robust to the presence 
of outliers than other prediction methods such as Ordinary Least Squares. Quantile regression 
has been applied to a range of market risk models, notably by Nobel economics laureate 
Robert Engle, who together with Manganelli (Engle & Manganelli, 2004) applied them to a 
suite of CAViaR (Conditional Autoregressive Value at Risk) models. The authors make the 
point that modelling techniques must be responsive to financial disasters, and that existing 
VaR techniques are inadequate as they only focus on one particular quantile. By not properly 
estimating risk, financial institutions can underestimate (or overestimate) the risk, 
consequently maintaining excessively high (low) capital. Their CaViaR models are unique in 
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that instead of modelling a single distribution, they can directly model different quantiles, 
including the tail of the distribution.  
This project is unique and innovative in that it extends the quantile regression  
techniques from market risk applications to structural credit risk models. The remainder of 
the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will examine the Japanese banking industry. 
Sections 3 and 4 will discuss key metrics used in this paper including the Merton / KMV 
model (and its associated Distance to Default and Probability of Default measures) and 
quantile regression. Section 5 includes Data and Methodology. Results are presented in 
Section 6, followed by Conclusions in Section 7.   
 
2. The Japanese Banking Industry 
 
The financial services industry in Japan has been undergoing a reorganisation since 
the 1990s which was triggered by the Japanese asset price bubble bursting. This was the start 
tart of a decade long recession (referred to as the lost decade). Aggressive economic 
stimulation took place, including rate reductions which started in 1991 virtually reaching zero 
in 1995. The late 1990s heralded the Asian Financial crisis followed by further economic 
stimulation and capital injections into undercapitalised financial institutions, together  with 
outright purchase by the Bank of Japan of banks’ asset backed commercial paper and asset 
backed securities (Shirakawa, 2010). Non-performing loans (NPLs) reached a peak of 8.5% 
in 2002, dropping steadily thereafter to 1.4% in 2007  (Bank of Japan, 2009a). Over the 
period of the Asian Financial Crisis, market values of stocks, particularly in the financial 
sector, fell dramatically. The Nikkei 500 Bank index, per Datastream, showed a drop of 78% 
from June 1996, bottoming in  March 2003  with most of this drop (55%) taking place pre-
2000. 
The GFC saw the NPL ratio increase for the first time in 7 years to 1.7% at end 2008 
and 1.9% at end 2009, still substantially lower than the figure in 2002. In 2008, both the 
major banks and the regional banks recorded net losses for the first time after 2003. A range 
of measures to address the crisis included cutting policy rates, introducing special fund 
supplying operations to facilitate corporate finance, and introducing measures to insure the 
stability of financial markets. In 2009, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) resumed its purchases of 
stocks (which had commenced in the 1990’s) held by financial institutions. A ‘policy package 
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to address the economic crisis' was introduced in April 2009. This included encouragement 
(and extension) of the use of the measures which were already available in the Act on Special 
Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions. To support funding for small firms, 
additional emergency guarantee facilities were made available by the credit guarantee 
corporations. In, 2009 BOJ expanded the range of eligible collateral for loans on deed to the 
government and those with government guarantees.  
Currently, the banking industry is centralized into three Mega Banks; they are 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group and Mizuho Financial 
Group. These three banks came into being through various mergers of large banks to 
consolidate their standing capital ratios in the light of Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
regulation regarding capital adequacy ratios for international banks. With the reforms, many 
regional and international banks have either merged or dissolved. 
There are many categories of banks in Japan including the Mega Banks, Regional 
Banks, Money Center Banks, On-line Banks and Trust Banks (see Table 1 for the 10 largest 
Banks). There are 47 prefectures in Japan and in each prefecture there are at least two banks 
operating. Overall the number of banks operating in Japan is over 150, with the three Mega 
Banks having assets totalling over $US 5 trillion representing over 50% of total assets of all 
Japanese banks. 
The Japanese banking regulator is the Financial Services Agency (FSA). BOJ is not a 
regulator, but “contributes to the maintenance of an orderly financial system” (Tamaki, 
2008), including on and off-site monitoring of banks. BOJ (2009b) recognises the importance 
of holding additional capital to sustain banks through downturn periods: “Japan’s financial 
institutions should strengthen their capital bases. They need to be able to cope with the risks 
that might materialise due to the changes in economic and financial circumstances”.  
At March 2010, the Japanese banks in this study had weighted average equity ratios 
of just over 5% (see Table 1, which also includes size and capital adequacy information). 
This compares to 2009 equity ratios (2010 not yet available) for banks in Australia of 6.2%, 
Canada 5.2%, Europe (excludes UK) 3.2%, UK 3.2%, and US 7.1% (Allen & Powell, 2010). 
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Table 1 Data Comparison of Key Japanese Banks in our Study 
 
Market Cap, Asset and Equity figures are obtained from DataStream at March 30 2010. Tier 1, Total Capital, 
and Equity ratios were obtained from individual companies’ financial reports for the year ending March 2010, 
with total ratios representing asset-weighted averages. The equity ratio is the book value (per March 2010 
annual financial reports) of Equity to Total Assets.  
 
3. Distance to Default (DD) and Probability of Default (PD) 
 
The Merton / KMV approach (which we use in this study, but modify to incorporate 
quantiles) provides an estimate of distance to default (DD) and probability of default (PD). 
The model holds that there are 3 key determinants of default: the asset values of a firm, the 
risk of fluctuations in those asset values, and leverage (the extent to which the assets are 
funded by borrowings as opposed to equity). The firm defaults when debt exceeds assets, and 
DD measures how far away the firm is from this default event. KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 
2003), in modelling defaults using their extensive worldwide  database, find that firms do not 
generally default when asset values reach liability book values, and many continue to service 
their debts at this point as the long-term nature of some liabilities provides some breathing 
space. KMV finds the default point to lie somewhere between total liabilities and current 
liabilities and therefore use current liabilities plus half of long term debt as the default point. 
 
T
TFVDD
V
V
σ
σµ )5.0()/ln( 2−+
=       (1) 
)( DDNPD −=
        (2) 
Mistubishi Financial Group 74.14           2,177.44    5.55% 11.18% 14.87%
Sumitomo Financial Group 46.20           1,310.26    5.72% 11.15% 15.02%
Mizuho Financial Group 30.66           1,666.53    3.75% 9.09% 13.46%
Resona Holdings 14.56           433.39       5.61% 10.81% 13.81%
Sumitomo Trust & Banking 9.82             219.09       7.08% 9.88% 14.17%
Bank of Yokohama 6.67             127.60       6.39% 9.85% 12.20%
Chuo Mitsui Trust & Holdings 6.23             158.69       5.71% 9.86% 13.80%
Shizuoka Bank 6.07             96.72        7.96% 14.06% 15.32%
Chiba Bank 5.35             109.25       5.93% 11.39% 12.80%
Mizuho Trust & Banking 5.05             63.02        5.32% 10.07% 15.73%
Others (Average) 1.21             37.80        5.08% 9.04% 11.12%
Total 275.25         8,542.56    5.33% 9.27% 11.53%
Tier 1 
Capital 
Ratio
Total 
Capital 
RatioBanks
Market 
Capitalisation 
(USD $bn)
Assets 
(USD $bn)
Equity 
Ratio
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where 
V  =  market value of firm’s assets 
F =  face value of firm’s debt (in line with KMV, this is defined as current liabilities 
plus one half of long term debt)  
µ  =  an estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets (we measure µ as the 
mean of the change  in lnV of the period being modelled as per Vassalou & Xing  
(2002) 
N  =  cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
 
To estimate asset volatilities and arrive at DD, we follow an  intensive estimation, 
iteration and convergence procedure, as outlined by studies such as Bharath & Shumway 
(2009), Vassalou & Xing (2009), and Allen and Powell (2009).  
       
4. Quantile Regression:  
 
Quantile regression per Koenker & Basset  (1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) is 
a technique for dividing a dataset into parts. Minimising the sum of symmetrically weighted 
absolute residuals yields the median where 50% of observations fall either side. Similarly, 
other quantile functions are yielded by minimising the sum of asymmetrically weighted 
residuals, where the weights are functions of the quantile in question per equation 3. This 
makes quantile regression robust to the presence of outliers. 
 	
            (3) 
 where (.) is the absolute value function, providing the th sample quantile with its solution.  
 
Figure 1  Illustrative Quantile Regression Example  
Figure 1 (Andreas Steiner, 2006) 
illustrates the quantile regression 
technique. The x and y axes represent 
any two variables being compared 
(such as age and height; or market 
returns and individual asset returns). 
The 50% quantile (middle line) is the 
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median, where 50% of observations fall below the line and 50% above. Similarly, the 90% 
quantile (top line) is where 10% of observations lie above the line, and 10% quantile (bottom 
line) has 90% of observations above the line. The intercept and slope are obtained by 
minimising the sum of the asymmetrically weighted residuals for each line.  
The quantile regression technique allows direct modelling of the tails of a distribution 
rather than ‘average’ based techniques such as ordinary least squares or credit models which 
focus on ‘average’ losses over a period of time. The technique has enjoyed wide application 
such as investigations into wage structure (Buschinsky, 1994; Machado & Mata, 2005), 
production efficiency (Dimelis & Lowi, 2002), and educational attainment (Eide & 
Showalter, 1998). Financial applications include Engle & Manganelli (2004) and Taylor 
(2008) to the problem of Value at Risk (VaR) and Barnes and Hughes (2002) who use 
quantile regression analysis to study CAPM in their work on stock market returns. 
In a stock market context Beta measures the systematic risk of an individual security 
with CAPM predicting what a particular asset or portfolio’s expected return should be 
relative to its risk and the market return.  The lower and upper extremes of the distribution are 
often not well fitted by OLS. Allen, Gerrans, Singh, & Powell (2009), using quantile 
regression, show large and sometimes significant differences between returns and beta, both 
across quantiles and through time. These extremes of a distribution are especially important 
to credit risk measurement as it at these times when failure is most likely. We therefore 
expand these quantile techniques to credit risk by measuring Betas for fluctuating assets 
across time and across quantiles, and the corresponding impact of these quantile 
measurements on DD, PD and capital, as outlined further in the following methodology 
section.  
 
5. Data and Methodology 
 
We use all banks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which data is available on 
Datastream (69 Banks in total as per Appendix 4). These banks have a market cap of 
USD$275 billion and assets of $8.5 trillion. Data is obtained for 10 years. We have split the 
data into 2 periods to compare how the banks were affected during the GFC as compared to 
pre-GFC. The GFC period includes the 3 years from January 2007 - December 2009. The 
pre-GFC period includes the 7 years from January 2000 – December 2009.  7 years aligns 
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with the Basel II advanced method for measuring credit risk. The early years of this period 
include the latter years of the Asian Financial crisis as well as the ensuing recovery period. 
These are the 7 years that a bank, under the advanced model, would have used to measure 
credit risk (and determine capital requirements) going into the GFC, usually based on the 
average risk over that period. By comparing this to the actual GFC data, we can determine 
how adequate these capital requirements would have been. In addition to the pre-GFC and 
GFC periods, we also measure 2008 as a single year. This year was the height of the GFC, 
and as it is during the most extreme period that banks are likely to fail, it is important that we 
isolate and measure extreme periods.  
We calculate DD and PD for each bank for each period using the methodology 
outlined in Section 3, with our “All Bank” figures being asset weighted averages. Quantiles 
for each period are calculated as per Section 4, with two fundamental differences. Firstly, 
quantile Beta analysis is normally applied to share prices, whereas we are using daily market 
asset values (calculated as per the methodology in Section 3). Secondly, Betas for shares are 
normally measured as returns of an individual share against the market. We instead are 
comparing risk measurements between two different periods (e.g. GFC v pre-GFC) and 
between different quantiles within those periods.  Here we introduce the new concept of a 
benchmark DD (together with the associated PD and asset value standard deviation), so that 
we can ascertain what buffer capital is needed when asset values fall below that benchmark. 
To explain this concept, assume that a bank (or regulator) deems that the aggregate bank 
capital (leverage) ratio was adequate based on the 7 year pre-GFC asset volatility, and sets 
this as the benchmark capital (K). Our modelling in this study shows that the DD for this 
period was 3.276 (see table 2 for a year by year breakdown) which has an associated and a 
PD of 0.058%. At this point capital (equity ratios) of banks were approximately 5% and we 
will assume this is set as the benchmark. In its simplest form the Merton model is essentially 
a measure of capital (assets – liabilities) divided by the standard deviation of asset values. As 
volatility increases, DD (and hence capital) reduces proportionately. As asset value volatility 
is the denominator of the Merton model, a doubling of volatility (2/1 = 2) means that DD 
and capital (K) halve, and capital will have to be doubled (i.e. a capital buffer of 5% held) to 
restore the benchmark DD back to its original value. Thus any asset fluctuations and increase 
in DD above the benchmark value require a corresponding percentage increase in capital.  
We can therefore measure the extent of capital buffers required to counter extreme 
fluctuations as: 
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Required Capital  Buffer = (2/1 K) - K       (4) 
 
The capital buffer will have a minimum of zero as capital should not fall below the 
benchmark. The benchmark is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a situation where the 
capital benchmark is 5% and actual volatility (and hence DD) has increased by 1.7x 
benchmark (2/1 = 1.7).  
 
Figure 2 Illustration of Required Capital Buffer Using a Benchmark 
  
 
In this study, we measure the asset value fluctuations occurring in various quantiles of 
the GFC period against the pre-GFC benchmark. To allow measurement of the GFC period 
(or any other period within the 10 year sample period used) against the benchmark, we need a 
benchmark which covers the entire 10 years. We achieve this by bootstrapping the 7 year pre-
GFC returns and extending them to 2009. We use F tests to test for volatility between the 
benchmark and each quantile (results for these are discussed in Section 6 and shown in 
Appendices tables 1b, 2b and 3b) for each selected period and bank, and between each 
quantile within each selected period (results discussed in Section 6 and shown in Appendices 
tables 1c, 2c and 3c). F is 22/ 21, whereby a value of 1 shows no difference between the two 
samples measured (e.g. difference in variance between two quantiles) and a value of 3 shows 
variance of 3x higher for one of the two samples than the other. We use * to denote 
significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
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In addition to using the aggregated position for all 69 banks (for which we use asset 
weighted averages to obtain the total DD and PD for all banks), we select one Regional and 
one Major bank to illustrate how quantile regression applies to individual banks. When 
referring to “All Japanese Banks “ in this study we are referring to the 69 banks in our study.  
The profile of the two example banks is given in the following two paragraphs.  
 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG) is the holding company for Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking, which is one of Japan's largest banks (along with Mitsubishi UFJ and 
Mizuho). The bank's operations include retail, corporate, and investment banking; asset 
management; securities trading; and lending. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking has some 500 
domestic branches and another 20 branches abroad. Other units of SMFG include credit card 
company Sumitomo Mitsui Card, brokerage SMBC Friend Securities, management 
consulting firm Japan Research Institute, and Sumitomo Mitsui Finance and Leasing. In the 
US it operates the California-based Manufacturers Bank. The bank had total assets of US 1.3 
trillion at March 2010 Financial year end, a total capital ratio of 15.02% and a tier I ratio of 
11.15%. Out of the three mega Japanese banks, Sumitomo Mitsui has the highest total capital 
adequacy ratio. 
 Shizuoka Regional Bank is headquartered in Shizuoka, Shizuoka Prefecture. It has 
187 domestic branches, primarily concentrated in the Tokai region between Tokyo and Osaka 
and overseas offices in Los Angeles, New York, Brussels, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and 
Singapore. Shizuoka Bank's total assets stood at US$96,7 billion at March 2010  with loans 
and bills discounted  of US $64,6 billion. The bank's capital adequacy ratio at the same time 
was 15.32%, one of the highest ratios among Japanese banks, and it’s Tier I ratio was 
14.06%, substantially higher than the BIS standard of 8%. 
 
6. Results 
 
Table 2 shows how DD and PD differ from year to year of our 10 year sample period. 
2001 and 2002 were periods of high volatility for Japanese banks, although as noted in the 
introduction section, much of the downturn in equity and asset values arising from the Asian 
Financial Crisis, had already occurred prior to year 2000. The mid 2000’s were a period of 
low volatility and default probabilities, with 2008 (the height of the GFC) showing a 
substantial increase in risk as indicated by these measures, reducing again in 2009.  
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Table 2  Annual DD and PD  for All Japanese Banks from 2000 - 2009 
 
Distance to Default (DD) and Probability of Default (PD) for each year is calculated per Section 3. In summary, 
DD is the number of standard deviations that asset values are away from falling below debt values, based on 
asset value volatility. PD is calculated from DD and is the probability corresponding to the standard normal 
distribution. Figures are asset value weighted averages of all Japanese banks in our sample. 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of outcomes across all the periods measured, split into quantiles.  
 
 
Table 3  Quantile Distribution of Key Risk Indicators 
 
 
Asset Value Standard Deviation (), Distance to Default (DD), and Probability of Default (PD) are calculated 
per Section 3. Beta () is the coefficient of the benchmark and quantile asset value fluctuations as discussed in 
Sections 4 and 5.  
 
Year DD PD
2000 4.20 <0.01%
2001 2.07 1.93%
2002 2.21 1.37%
2003 6.99 <0.01%
2004 5.71 <0.01%
2005 8.36 <0.01%
2006 5.85 <0.01%
2007 2.78 0.27%
2008 0.99 16.13%
2009 2.77 0.28%
Distance to Default
 Quantile Pre GFC + GFC GFC 2008
- 5% 2.60 1.69 1.11
- 10% 2.57 1.62 1.09
- 50% 2.53 1.45 1.03 Beta (,
- 90% 2.50 1.35 0.88  Quantile Pre GFC + GFC GFC 2008
- 95% 2.49 1.34 0.87 - 5% 1.01 1.54 2.00
- 10% 1.02 1.61 2.04
Probability of Default - 50% 1.07 1.80 2.16
 Quantile Pre GFC + GFC GFC 2008 - 90% 1.11 1.93 2.50
- 5% 0.47% 4.55% 13.37% - 95% 1.12 1.95 2.56
- 10% 0.51% 5.24% 13.85%
- 50% 0.57% 7.36% 15.27%
- 90% 0.62% 8.84% 18.83%
- 95% 0.65% 9.05% 19.34%
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Moving left to right within each of the segments in table 3, the periods become more 
risky (the GFC period on its own being more risky than the entire period from 2000-2009, 
and 2008 being the most volatile of the GFC years). For example, the entire period DD at the 
50% level is 2.53 (PD 0.57%), whereas GFC DD for the same quantile is 1.45 (PD 7.36%), 
and 2008 on its own has a DD of 1.03 (PD 15.27%). Thus there is a dramatic increase in PDs 
during more risky times. There is also a shift in outcomes for different quantiles within each 
period. For example, PD almost doubles during the GFC from 4.55% (5% quantile) to 9.05% 
(95% quantile).  A typical ‘through the cycle’ OLS type approach using the Merton model, 
would produce results around the 50% quantile level for the entire period (PD 0.57%), 
whereas we see that PDs in fact fluctuate from 0.47% at a lowest risk position (top left 
segment of the PD table) to 19.34% at a highest risk position (bottom right of the PD table) 
during the most extreme 5% of 2008. Given that firms are far more likely to fail during the 
most extreme segments than during an ‘average’ period, it is important for banks and 
regulators to understand the extent of these fluctuations to ensure adequate provisions and 
capital for these times. Using equation 4 and the standard deviation figures in table 2, we can 
estimate capital buffers required to counter volatility.             
As risk increases, so too does  (as per the right hand segment of table 3) when 
comparing daily asset returns for each segment with the benchmark (which as per the 
methodology section, is based on the pre-GFC period). To illustrate this, we show selected  
values (and corresponding DD and PD) in figure 3. It is important to note that figure 3 is not 
a quantile graph from any particular period, but is a  comparison across selected periods. We 
see that  of the entire 2000 – 2008 period against the benchmark is 1.07, increasing to 1.8 
over the whole GFC period, then to 2.16 for 2008 only, and to 2.56 at the height of the GFC 
period in 2008 at the 95% quantile. The graph clearly shows how PDs shift dramatically with 
rising , ranging from 0.57% to 19.5%. It should be noted, that as we are measuring 
volatility, there are no negative values in our graphs. Naturally, the standard deviations of the 
returns are calculated using both positive and negative returns.   
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Figure 3 Beta Comparison During Key Periods – All Banks  
 
 
 
 
Appendices 1 - 3  provide a graphical illustration of the quantile measures, together 
with summary statistical tables for our two example banks as compared to the aggregated 
values for all banks, as well as the results for the  F tests (as explained in Section 5). 
Appendix 1 shows the entire 2000 – 2009 period, Appendix 2 shows the GFC years from 
2007 - 2009 and Appendix 3 shows 2008 on its own. The values calculated per these 
appendices allow estimating and comparing of capital buffers required to maintain capital at 
the benchmark value during extreme cycles for our sample banks as discussed in the next 3 
paragraphs.  
Consolidated All Banks had DD for the 3 year GFC period ranging from 1.69 at the 
5% quantile to 1.34 at the 95% level, dropping to 0.87 at the 95% quantile for the 2008 only 
period. The 95% GFC quantile asset value fluctuations exceed the benchmark by 
approximately 2.4 x, requiring the average Japanese bank in our sample to more than double 
their existing equity ratio to maintain an adequate capital buffer to counter this. All of these 
GFC quantiles, even the lowest 5% quantile is significantly higher than the benchmark at a 
99% confidence level using an F test.  
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For Shizouka Regional Bank, all quantiles during the GFC (and even more so during 
2008 only) had an asset value standard deviations and DD’s exceeding the benchmark, with 
even the 5% quantile exceeding the benchmark at a 99% level of confidence using an F test. 
The most extreme quantile (95% in 2008) had DD 1.26. Shizouka has a higher DD than “All 
Banks” with volatility during the GFC 95% quantile being 1.7x above the benchmark. 
However Shizouka already has an equity ratio of 7.96% per table 1, which is 1.6x above the 
benchmark, so would only need a very small additional capital buffer to counter these 
fluctuations.  
Sumitomo Financial Group had very high levels of asset volatility during the GFC, 
ranging from DD 0.80 at the 5% quantile to 0.63 at the 95% quantile. This fell to 0.18 at the 
most extreme quantile (95% in 2008). All of these GFC quantiles, even the lowest 5% 
quantile is significantly higher than the benchmark at a 99% confidence level using an F test.  
As the most extreme asset value fluctuations are more than treble the benchmark, Sumitomo 
would need capital buffers significantly higher than the average Japanese bank to restore their 
capital and DD levels to the benchmark. 
The above F tests compared the quantiles to the benchmark we set, which is based on 
pre-GFC volatility. We also tested for differences in volatility between the quantiles in each 
bank (e.g. is the 95% quantile asset volatility significantly different to asset volatility for all 
quantiles such as would be measured by an OLS approach). Here we note some differences 
between the banks. For Sumitomo the differences in variances between the quantiles in the 
various periods tend to be significant at the 99% level, but for Shizouka most quantile 
differences show lower significance, generally at the 95% level, showing that there is less 
extreme volatility (outliers) for Shizouka as compared to Sumitomo. This is reflected in the 
quantile graphs for Shizouka in the Appendices which show a narrower spread than the 
quantile graphs for All Banks and much narrower than Sumitomo.    
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study has examined a new approach to measuring credit risk through cycles. 
Using quantile regressions, the study has shown how market asset values can substantially 
change at different points, resulting in a wide range of DD and PD values for banks 
depending on the time period and quantile. Calculating credit risk based on averages through 
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a cycle, or using static models which calculate risk at a single point in time, could lead to 
insufficient provisions and capital buffers by banks. This can lead to the situation, such as 
happened during the GFC, where banks are left scrambling for capital just when it is most 
difficult to raise. Bank failure is most likely during extreme economic downturns, and loss 
provisions and capital need to account for these circumstances. Our approach provides a 
method to banks and regulators for estimating capital buffers to sustain banks during extreme 
economic downturns.   
 
 
 	
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Appendix 1: Quantile Regression for Selected Banks: 2000 – 2009 
 
F test in table 1b tests for differences in volatility between the benchmark and each quantile for each selected bank. F is 21/ 22, 
whereby a value of 1 shows no difference between the benchmark and the selected quantile and a value of 3 shows variance of 3 
xs higher for the selected quantile as compared to the benchmark. * denotes significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
Table 1c performs a similar F test to test for volatility differences between the selected quantile as compared to all quantiles. 
 
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Appendix 2: Quantile Regression for Selected Banks: 2007 – 2009 
 
F test in table 2b tests for differences in volatility between the benchmark and each quantile for each selected bank. F is 21/ 22, 
whereby a value of 1 shows no difference between the benchmark and the selected quantile and a value of 3 shows variance of 3x 
higher for the selected quantile as compared to the benchmark. * denotes significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
Table 2c performs a similar F test to test for volatility differences between the selected quantile as compared to all quantiles. 
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
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Appendix 3: Quantile Regression for Selected Banks 2008 
 
F test in table 3b tests for differences in volatility between the benchmark and each quantile for each selected bank. F is 21/ 22, 
whereby a value of 1 shows no difference between the benchmark and the selected quantile and a value of 3 shows variance of 3x 
higher for the selected quantile as compared to the benchmark. * denotes significance at the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. 
Table 3c performs a similar F test to test for volatility differences between the selected quantile as compared to all quantiles. 
 
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Appendix 4: All Japanese Banks Used in This Study 
   
 
  
Bank Bank
77 Bank 2,167.6           62,938.6            Kagoshima Bank 1,476.4              35,879.3            
Aichi Bank 880.2              27,895.1            Kansai Urban Banking 1,140.8              46,008.2            
Akita Bank 777.7              25,629.5            Keiyo Bank 1,349.2              36,396.1            
Aomori Bank 494.2              23,702.1            Kita-Nippon Bank 239.9                 12,799.7            
AWA Bank 1,399.8           28,512.3            Kiyo Holdings 969.2                 38,952.6            
Bank of Iwate 1,071.2           27,039.6            Michinoku Bank 293.2                 19,840.0            
Bank of Kyoto 3,482.0           76,114.7            Mie Bank 373.5                 17,517.7            
Bank of Nagoya 832.7              32,433.7            Minato Bank 535.9                 31,311.7            
Bank of Okinawa 853.3              17,204.0            Mitsubishi UFJ Fin. Group 74,143.0            2,177,444.0       
Bank of Saga 488.9              21,489.3            Miyazaki Bank 533.5                 20,705.1            
Bank of the Ryukyus 442.4              17,493.0            Mizuho Financial Goup 30,658.4            1,666,529.0       
Bank of Yokohama 6,665.5           127,602.2          Mizuho Trust & Banking 5,054.6              63,021.2            
Chiba Bank 5,346.8           109,248.9          Musashino bank 974.1                 37,998.7            
Chiba Kogyo Bank 396.9              23,451.1            Nagano Bank 177.0                 9,522.9              
Chugoku Bank 3,122.8           64,670.8            Nanto Bank 1,546.2              48,528.3            
Chukyo Bank 661.5              17,603.9            Nishi-Nippon City Bank 2,348.9              77,515.1            
Chuo Mitsui Holdings 6,228.4           158,686.5          Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank 1,218.8              42,917.5            
Daisan Bank 512.2              18,892.4            Oita Bank 631.0                 28,959.9            
Daishi Bank 1,280.3           48,062.0            Resona Holdings 14,557.3            433,391.6          
Daito Bank 89.0                7,024.3              San-In Godo Bank 1,412.0              41,606.3            
Ehime Bank 499.0              19,026.1            Sapporo Hokuyo Holdings 1,412.0              41,606.3            
Eighteenth Bank 533.5              24,902.6            Shiga Bank 1,676.1              46,029.7            
Fukui Bank 773.8              23,268.7            Shikoku Bank 723.5                 27,095.7            
Fukushima Bank 123.0              6,440.7              Shimizu Bank 384.0                 14,421.7            
Gunma Bank 2,730.9           65,974.8            Shinsei Bank 2,375.0              121,551.7          
Hachijuni bank 2,988.6           65,859.9            Shizuoka bank 6,070.3              96,719.3            
Hiroshima Bank 2,610.4           67,668.8            Sumitomo Mitsui Fin. Group 46,197.4            1,310,262.0       
Hokkoku Bank 1,257.2           34,193.3            Sumitomo Trust & Bank 9,820.9              219,091.5          
Hokuetsu Bank 415.8              23,738.6            Suruga Bank 2,206.1              34,910.1            
Hokuhoku Financial Group 3,053.1           107,366.2          Tochigi Bank 496.6                 25,597.5            
Hyakugo Bank 1,222.0           45,447.9            Toho Bank 813.5                 33,650.9            
Hyakujushi Bank 1,199.7           41,076.7            Tohoku Bank 148.1                 7,093.5              
Iyo Bank 3,036.1           55,753.7            Tokyo Tomin Bank 521.8                 26,331.8            
Joyo Bank 3,449.1           79,141.7            Tomato Bank 242.6                 9,259.1              
Juroku Bank 1,445.3           46,543.1            
Total Market Capitalisation 275,251.9       
Total Assets 8,542,562.0    
Market 
Capitalisation 
(US $m)
Total Assets 
(US $m)
Market 
Capitalisation 
(US $m)
Total Assets 
(US $m)
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